Information-not-thing: further problems with and alternatives to the belief that information is physical by Dinneen, Jesse David & Brauner, Christian
Information-not-thing: further problems with and alternatives to 
the belief that information is physical 
 
Jesse David Dinneen	
McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada	
jesse.david.dinneen@mcgill.ca 
 
Christian Brauner	
Universität Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany	
christian.brauner@uni-tuebingen.de 
 
 
Abstract: In this short paper, we show that a popular view in information science, information-as-thing, 
fails to account for a common example of information that seems physical. We then demonstrate how the 
distinction between types and tokens, recently used to analyse Shannon information, can account for this 
same example by viewing information as abstract, and discuss existing definitions of information that are 
consistent with this approach. 
 
Résumé: Dans ce court article nous montrons qu'une vision populaire en sciences de l'information, 
l'information en tant qu’une chose, échoue à rendre compte d'un exemple commun d'information qui 
semble physique. Nous démontrons ensuite comment la distinction type/token, utilisée récemment pour 
analyser l'information de Shannon, peut rendre compte de ce même exemple en considérant l'information 
comme abstraite, et nous discutons des définitions existantes de l’information qui sont compatibles avec 
cette approche.  
 
 
Introduction 
Understanding the nature of information and agreeing on its definition has proven extremely 
difficult for scholars in many disciplines. Scholars of information have articulated many views 
and definitions, divisible into several categories (Bates, 2009), while philosophers have worked 
to refine rigorous semantic definitions, and scientists have joined them to better understand 
mathematical definitions. Among this plurality of definitions is a view of information as a 
physical object, or information-as-thing (Buckland, 1991), which remains popular in the 
information sciences (IS; including information research and education, libraries, archives, 
museums, and information and cultural preservation institutions). 
In Dinneen and Brauner (2015) we argued that all three senses of information discussed in 
Buckland (1991), information-as-thing, -as-knowledge, and -as-process, which represent many 
previously given definitions of information, are practically and theoretically inadequate for use 
in IS. Here we pursue this thesis further by noting another problem entailed by viewing 
information as physical, and showing how using the type/token distinction avoids this problem 
while better accounting for examples of information. 
Information-as-thing 
The intuitive notion that information is physical, most famously explicated as information-as-
thing (Buckland, 1991), is fervently defended in IS. Despite qualifying that information-as-thing 
is a representation of knowledge that cannot be confused with the knowledge itself, Buckland 
also argues at length that information systems deal directly with physical information, including 
bits, books, and objects (p.352). In Dinneen and Brauner (2015) we noted two problems with this 
view: (1) that identical objects can afford non-identical information, and vice versa that (2) non-
identical objects can afford identical information. These problems suggest that physical things 
cannot be information, and information therefore cannot be a physical thing; here we examine an 
additional, related problem.	
Take as an example a library patron borrowing, reading, and returning a book about how to 
perform gardening tasks. In the view of information-as-thing, the book’s author creates physical 
information about gardening, either as the book itself or within it, and the patron then views 
(reads) the information-as-thing (book), and by this process, in successful cases, obtains 
information. 	
At face value, this account is intuitive, but it is problematic if taken seriously as a claim about the 
nature of information. For, simply, if the information gained by the patron was the same entity 
that is the book (or its printed contents), they would lose the information upon returning the 
book. This sounds absurd, of course, and we intend it to, because the selfsame information that is 
that particular book obviously cannot simultaneously be in two distinct places (e.g., on the 
shelves and possessed by the patron). The obvious response is that the patron has produced their 
own copy of the information (e.g., information-as-knowledge), but this implicitly abandons the 
idea that the physical object itself is information in any meaningful sense: the patron possesses 
not a book or its printed words (nor a copy or representation of these), but rather possesses the 
information how to garden.	
Though our example here was of a book, this problem and the ones of identity discussed in 
Dinneen and Brauner (2015) apply to objects in museums and archives, and bits on drives, and 
may also apply to views of information-as-process, depending on whether the processes are 
physical in their nature. Next, we look at an alternative account of the example.	
Information as type 
Another way of understanding our example can be found in applying the analysis made by 
Christopher Timpson in his well-known PhD thesis on quantum information, later refined and 
published in a book (Timpson, 2013). We explain his view first, then adapt it to our example. 
Starting with classical approaches to information, Timpson analyses Shannon’s mathematical 
formulation of information, and identifies a distinction in Shannon’s worki between information 
as quantity, or the amount of information produced or transmitted, and information as piece, or 
that which is produced or transmitted (Timpson, 2013). Timpson argues that both kinds of 
information are abstract. For information quantity, this is straightforward: quantities are abstract. 
Understanding why information as piece is abstract requires first understanding a simple 
distinction, popularized by C. S. Peirce and widely used in philosophy and science (Wetzel, 
2006), between types and tokens.	
Timpson states that the aim of communication protocols is to reproduce at a destination a token 
of some message type (Timpson, 2013). For example, two sequence tokens {1, 3, 5} and {1, 3, 
5} are of the same type and so when compressing and transmitting these sequences “the piece of 
information is not the token produced at the source [or reproduced at the destination], but the 
corresponding type” (Lombardi, Fortin, & López, 2016). In other words, the sequence {1, 3, 5} 
should be produced at the destination, but it need not be the same token of that sequence found at 
the source. So information as piece is abstract, because it is a type, and types are abstract. Details 
of Timpson’s argument have been critiqued and refined (Lombardi, Fortin, & López, 2016), and 
his view of mathematical information as abstract is now generally accepted among philosophers 
of physics (Lombardi, Holik, & Vanni, 2016).	
We return now to our example of the patron borrowing a book on gardening. Using the 
type/token distinction, we may say that an author possessed information tokens of types 
describing how to do various gardening tasks, created separate tokens of those types while 
penning the book, that many additional tokens were made when the book was printed, and that 
when a patron reads the book, assuming they did not already know how to garden, they form 
their own tokens of the intended types. The author is concerned while writing the book that with 
their words they have accurately represented the information they wish to convey, that is, the 
information types. The book’s copy editors and typesetters are concerned that the tokens look a 
certain way, but are typically uninterested in the particular information types implemented. A 
patron is concerned with reading the book in such a way that they understand what the author 
was trying to communicate, that is, that they form tokens of the correct information types. We 
may say that exposure to the book’s information token (by reading) has produced in the patron’s 
knowledge tokens of the same information types as the author’s tokens.	
Timpson saw that his argument may apply to everyday senses of information in addition to 
mathematical ones, and it seems here that it is useful for accounting for an everyday case of 
information. The resulting account is more sensible than the one produced by viewing 
information as physical, wherein information seemed to be breaking an object’s identity by 
allowing it to be in two places at once, and does not encounter the problems we identified in our 
previous work. Buckland, who coined information-as-thing, was aware of the type/token 
distinction, and even employs it in the same paper where information-as-thing is outlined to 
discuss the relative value of copies (tokens) of texts and digital records (types). For example, 
Hesse’s novel Steppenwolf is a type, instantiated in many tokens (printed copies). But we have 
demonstrated here that the distinction applies further still, to information itself: information 
systems (libraries, computers) deal with physical objects (books, hard drives) that contain or 
encode tokens (text, bits), which represent some information type (facts or fiction, applications, 
records). The preservation, management, access, study, and so on of both information types and 
tokens is of interest to us in IS, but information tokens are of concern and value not in virtue of 
being information, but in virtue of being tokens that implement information types. This enables 
producing, for example in a reader’s knowledge or remote server’s hard drive, other tokens of 
the same type, and because they do this, we take interest in them. This is consistent with 
Popper’s view of three worlds, influential to many foundational writings in IS and summarized 
nicely by Bates (2009): information objects (tokens) are part of World 1, the physical world, and 
their logical contents (information types) are part of World 3, an abstract world.	
Conclusion	
Information professionals, researchers, and educators should be sensitive to common conceptions 
of information, but benefit nonetheless from having a rigorous understanding of the nature of 
information. Views of information as physical, such as information-as-thing, encounter problems 
in accounting for typical cases of information, and viewing information as an abstract type 
avoids these problems and provides a better account. That information is abstract is consistent 
with some existing definitions of information, including Marcia Bates’s (2006) definition of 
information as “the pattern of organization of energy or matter”, Luciano Floridi’s semantic 
conception of information as true, well-formed, meaningful data (Floridi, 2005). Bates’s view 
explicitly distinguishes information (a pattern of organization) from its physical matter or 
energy, and patterns may be conceived of as abstract and as types. Floridi’s view requires that 
data be represented, but does not require “material implementation of the data representations” 
(Floridi, 2015, 1.6), and so the data may be abstract, producing abstract information. Both views 
therefore avoid the problems of physical information discussed above. 
We have previously discussed the strengths and weaknesses of both views (Dinneen & Brauner, 
2015), stating that Bates’s constitutes an excellent contribution to understanding the character of 
information and deserves refinement to avoid conflating data with information, and that Floridi’s 
view is theoretically and practically robust for use in IS, but excludes some intuitive examples of 
information, such as fiction and poetry, because they are not true in the traditional sense. 
However, Floridi does articulate how these items can be regarded as trueii at some level of 
abstraction (Floridi, 2011). Further analysis is required to understand the full implications of this 
for implementations of Floridi’s definition in the information professions, but the theory’s ability 
to account for such categories should be noted and regarded as a theoretical strength.  
While the definition of information adopted in any given instance of information research, 
practice, or policymaking will likely answer foremost to practical concerns, we have shown 
above how theoretical confusions present in some definitions may entail unwanted practical 
manifestations, and thus encourage the use of sound definitions such as those viewing 
information as abstract. 
																																								 																				
i	Lombardi,	Fortin,	and	López	(2016)	contest	that	this	distinction	is	explicit	in	Shannon	and	Weaver	(1949),	but	once	
possessed	the	distinction's	origin	is	not	essential	to	the	present	discussion.	
ii	We	thank	Prof.	Betsy	Martens	for	bringing	this	to	our	attention.	
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